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OPINION 
______________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 
 Ricardo Pieschacon-Villegas (“Pieschacon-Villegas”) 
petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (“BIA” or “Board”) dismissing his appeal of the 
Immigration Judge‟s (“IJ”) denial of his request for deferral 
of removal under the United Nations Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (“CAT”).  Pieschacon-Villegas seeks this Court‟s 
review because he asserts that: (1) the BIA used an incorrect 
legal standard for determining whether torture would be 
inflicted with the acquiescence of the Colombian government 
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and (2) the BIA failed to take into account evidence in the 
record demonstrating that, if Pieschacon-Villegas is removed 
to Colombia, he will more likely than not be tortured with the 
acquiescence of a public official.  We will grant the petition 
and remand to the BIA.      
I.  BACKGROUND 
Pieschacon-Villegas was born in 1969 and is a 
Colombian native and citizen.  He has entered and left the 
United States on a number of occasions.  Pieschacon-Villegas 
last entered the United States as a special parolee in 
December 2007.  One of Pieschacon-Villegas‟s siblings lives 
in the United States and his other siblings and his parents live 
in Colombia.    
From 1996 until 2003, Pieschacon-Villegas received 
fees for laundering Colombian drug traffickers‟ money.  In 
1999, Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) agents in New 
Jersey learned about Pieschacon-Villegas‟s involvement in 
money laundering during an undercover investigation.  The 
FBI was aware that Pieschacon-Villegas was involved in a 
transaction with a major drug operation in 1999, in which he 
made wire transfers totaling $218,467.  He was subsequently 
arrested and indicted for his involvement in that money 
laundering scheme. 
On August 21, 2003, Pieschacon-Villegas pled guilty 
to conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1956(h), for those 1999 transfers.  He agreed to 
cooperate with the FBI and he was released on an unsecured 
bond.  His conviction and sentencing were deferred.   
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Pieschacon-Villegas cooperated with the FBI from 
2003 to 2007.  During this time period, the FBI paid him 
$4,000 per month for the expenses he incurred during his 
cooperation.  (App. at 461.)  As a cooperator, Pieschacon-
Villegas bought drugs and delivered money to help the FBI 
build cases against drug traffickers.  The targeted drug 
traffickers worked for, or were associated with, the 
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (“AUC”), a paramilitary 
group.  Pieschacon-Villegas worked from Colombia and 
would come to the United States to carry out transactions.  
The Colombian Department of Administration Security 
(“DAS”) was aware that Pieschacon-Villegas was 
collaborating with the FBI. 
In 2007, Pieschacon-Villegas was arrested upon 
returning to Colombia from the United States for failure to 
pay a fine a number of years earlier.  Pieschacon-Villegas 
paid the fine, but remained in jail for twenty-two days.   
This incident in jail provides the critical backdrop for 
Pieschacon-Villegas‟s petition for review.  He posited that his 
arrest and jailing were to facilitate his murder by the AUC.  
Pieschacon-Villegas testified
1
 that Colombian jails are 
managed by the AUC and the Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejercito del Pueblo 
(“FARC”), another paramilitary group, and that the DAS 
informed AUC members of his incarceration so he would be 
harmed or killed. 
                                                 
1
 This refers to Pieschacon-Villegas‟s testimony on July 30, 
2009 during the removal proceedings before the IJ.  The IJ 
found Pieschacon-Villegas‟s testimony to be credible and the 
BIA did not disturb that finding. 
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On the day Pieschacon-Villegas was to be released 
from jail, he was led to a room to meet with his attorney.  
However, Pieschacon-Villegas‟s attorney was not in the room 
when Pieschacon-Villegas arrived there.  Instead, Pieschacon-
Villegas saw a man whom he did not recognize, so 
Pieschacon-Villegas left the room, went back to his cell, and 
called an associate who had also cooperated with the FBI.  
His associate brought an armored car to pick Pieschacon-
Villegas up from jail.  Pieschacon-Villegas asserted in his 
asylum application and during his testimony that when he 
tried to leave prison that day he saw people whom he had 
dealt with in the AUC waiting outside in vehicles.  
Pieschacon-Villegas testified that he thought these men were 
there to kill him, so he went back inside the jail and a prison 
official allowed the armored car into the prison to pick him 
up.  Police officers who arrived on the scene said that the 
armored car had been involved in a crime.  Pieschacon-
Villegas testified that the allegation that the armored car had 
been involved in a crime was a ploy to ensure that police 
officers would kill him during a pursuit or provide false 
justification for his murder if he had left jail in that car.   
Pieschacon-Villegas‟s actual attorney then called the 
military leader of the city and municipality, Baranquilla, in 
which the jail is located.  The military leader sent a police 
escort to take Pieschacon-Villegas to the police station and 
dismissed the charge regarding the armored car being 
involved in a crime.   
During the time Pieschacon-Villegas was in jail, the 
FBI arrested and extradited four alleged drug traffickers, 
including Miguel Amezquita (“Amezquita”), who had worked 
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with Pieschacon-Villegas in the money laundering business.
2
  
Pieschacon-Villegas also contends that when the four men 
were arrested they all knew of his collaboration with the FBI.  
According to Pieschacon-Villegas, Amezquita accused him of 
cooperating with the FBI and wrote a letter to other money 
launderers saying that he was a “rat” and that he would be 
killed.  IJ Removal Proceedings Decision at 13 (July 30, 
2009).   
The record of the removal proceedings also includes 
sworn declarations from Nelson Malpica Rodriguez 
(“Rodriguez”) and Pieschacon-Villegas‟s wife and his 
mother.  Each of them swore that numerous notes threatening 
the lives of Pieschacon-Villegas and his family had been 
delivered to Pieschacon-Villegas‟s mother‟s building.3  
Pieschacon-Villegas produced for the record the asylum 
application his wife submitted, in which she states that FBI 
                                                 
2
 Pieschacon-Villegas asserts that the FBI had obtained an 
arrest warrant for a fifth man, but that warrant was not 
executed. 
3
 Copies of a number of these notes were also included in the 
record.  Translations of the notes include the following 
statements: “RICARDO PIESCHACON MRS AND 
CHILDREN MAY YOU REST IN PEACE,” (App. at 206); 
“many  . . . will be waiting your arrival again.  You fucked us 
but worse off will be you and your people,” (Id. at 210); “All 
the money in the world won‟t be enough to hide your woman, 
your children, brothers and mother.  Poor „Cuchita,‟ with a 
son so gonnorhea [slang for vile or horrible] and on top of 
that, a frog [slang for rat],” (Id. at 212 (alterations in 
original)).  One of the letters was signed, “YOUR EX-
FRIENDS.”  (Id. at 208.) 
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agents suggested that, if she valued her life and the life of her 
children, she should not go back to Colombia because of 
these threats.     
On December 27, 2007, Pieschacon-Villegas traveled 
to the United States and was arrested on a bail revocation 
charge because FBI agents believed Pieschacon-Villegas was 
involved in money laundering outside of the parameters of his 
FBI cooperation.  On June 11, 2008, Pieschacon-Villegas 
pled guilty to money laundering based on the 1999 transfers 
referenced his 2003 plea agreement.  He was sentenced to 
thirty months of incarceration.     
On November 18, 2008, the Department of Homeland 
Security (“DHS”) served Pieschacon-Villegas with a Notice 
to Appear, charging him with being removable from the 
United States because: (1) he was an alien who had been 
convicted of acts which constituted a crime involving moral 
turpitude, see Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 
212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I); (2) he was 
an alien who the Attorney General knows, or has reason to 
believe, has engaged in money laundering, as described in 18 
U.S.C. §§ 1956 and 1957, INA § 212(a)(2)(I)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(2)(I)(i); and (3) he was an applicant for admission to 
the United States who did not possess a valid entry document, 
see INA § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). 
On February 18, 2009, Pieschacon-Villegas appeared 
before the IJ and conceded removability.  On or about April 
10, 2009, Pieschacon-Villegas submitted an application for 
deferral of removal under the CAT.   
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A. IJ Decision 
In addition to Pieschacon-Villegas‟s testimony before 
the IJ regarding prior threats and alleged attempts to harm 
him, he testified that he would be killed by members of the 
AUC or the FARC if he returned to Colombia.   
On July 30, 2009, the IJ issued a decision denying 
Pieschacon-Villegas deferral of removal.  The IJ described 
Pieschacon-Villegas‟s testimony and other exhibits and 
reports submitted by both parties on Colombian country 
conditions.  The IJ noted exhibits stating that, although the 
Colombian government has attempted to demobilize 
paramilitary groups and has claimed that all such 
organizations have been demobilized, a number of the groups 
(AUC and FARC) are still active, despite the illegality of 
membership. 
The record before the IJ also included information 
indicating that a number of government officials were being 
investigated for alleged links to paramilitary groups.  Further, 
twenty-seven army officers, including three generals, four 
colonels, and the head of the army had been fired or forced to 
resign due to civil rights violations.  Additionally, nineteen 
military personnel had been charged with murder, forced 
disappearance, or false testimony.   
The Colombian government had acknowledged that 
security forces had been responsible for extrajudicial 
executions in Soacha.  The military often claimed jurisdiction 
over these cases but would close the cases without serious 
investigation.  As a result, Colombian President Álvaro Uribe 
stated that the Soacha killings would be investigated by 
civilian courts.   
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The IJ noted that it was “clear that the government of 
Colombia is struggling with corruption” and “officials 
sometimes engaged in corrupt practices with impunity.”  IJ 
Removal Proceedings Decision at 19 (July 30, 2009).  Some 
members of government security forces may have directly 
participated in paramilitary atrocities.  The IJ continued that 
“any actions taken by government officials in Colombia in 
support of paramilitary groups are in contradiction to 
government policy.”  Id. at 20.   
The IJ found that Pieschacon-Villegas testified 
credibly regarding his cooperation with the FBI and working 
with individuals associated with the AUC.  The IJ also 
believed Pieschacon-Villegas‟s assessment that his 
cooperation would endanger his life if he returned to 
Colombia.   
The IJ noted that he did not understand why 
Pieschacon-Villegas alleged that he would be harmed by the 
FARC
4
 and found that any harm inflicted by the FARC would 
not be inflicted by, or at the instigation of, or with the consent 
or acquiescence of, the Colombian government.  The IJ found 
that any harm inflicted on Pieschacon-Villegas by the AUC 
would be “„extrajudicial acts of brutality‟ by „isolated rogue 
agents . . . [committed] not only in contravention of 
[Colombia‟s] laws and policies . . . but committed despite 
authorities [sic] best efforts to root out such misconduct‟, and 
therefore, not torture as that term is defined.”  Id. at 22–23 
(citing In re Y-L-, A-G- and R-S-R-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 270, 283 
(BIA 2002)).   
                                                 
4
 Pieschacon-Villegas did not work with anyone who was 
associated with the FARC. 
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Because Pieschacon-Villegas was not harmed when he 
was in the Barranquilla prison and the police helped to protect 
him, the IJ found that Pieschacon-Villegas failed to carry his 
burden for deferral of removal.   
Pieschacon-Villegas appealed the IJ‟s decision to the 
BIA. 
B. BIA Decision 
On December 3, 2009, the BIA issued its decision 
dismissing Pieschacon-Villegas‟s appeal.  Without citing any 
sources, the BIA noted that “[CAT] protection does not 
extend to persons who fear entities that a government is 
unable to control.  To demonstrate acquiescence, the 
respondent must do more than show that the officials are 
simply aware of the activity constituting torture yet are 
powerless to stop it.”  In re Pieschacon-Villegas, A049 191 
076, at 2 (BIA Dec. 3, 2009).  The BIA referenced the 
country reports submitted to the IJ.  The BIA agreed with the 
IJ‟s decision to deny deferral of removal because “the record 
reflects that the Colombian government actively opposes the 
organizations that the respondent fears.  Thus, we reject the 
respondent‟s argument on appeal that the Colombian 
government would acquiesce to his torture under a willful 
blindness theory.”  Id. (internal citation omitted).  The BIA 
also noted that Pieschacon-Villegas failed to show a clear 
probability that he would be tortured while in the custody or 
control of the offender.  The BIA continued that  
the existence of a consistent 
pattern of gross, flagrant, or mass 
violations of human rights in a 
particular country does not, as 
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such, constitute sufficient grounds 
for determining that a particular 
person would be in danger of 
being subject to torture upon his 
return to that country.  Specific 
grounds must exist that indicate 
the respondent would be 
personally at risk. 
Id. (internal citation omitted). 
Pieschacon-Villegas petitions for our review.
5
 
                                                 
5
 Pieschacon-Villegas originally requested a Stay of Removal 
pending appeal which was granted.  On March 28, 2011, 
Pieschacon-Villegas‟s counsel filed a motion to lift the Stay 
of Removal and indicated that Pieschacon-Villegas would 
await the results of the petition for review from abroad.  In 
May 2011, after oral argument, we granted the motion to lift 
the Stay of Removal and, on May 23, 2011, Pieschacon-
Villegas was removed to Colombia.  Pieschacon-Villegas‟s 
removal does not moot his petition for review “[b]ecause a 
final order of removal creates „sufficient collateral 
consequences.‟”  Gomez-Zuluaga v. Att'y Gen., 527 F.3d 
330, 339 n.4 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Amanfi v. Ashcroft, 328 
F.3d 719, 724-25 n.1 (3d Cir. 2003)).  “[S]ufficient collateral 
consequences” flow from a BIA order of removal to make an 
appeal a live case or controversy under Article III because an 
order of removal prevents the removed person from entering 
the United States for a period of years.  Moi Chong v. District 
Director, I.N.S., 264 F.3d 378, 384-85 (3d Cir. 2001). 
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II. JURISDICTION and STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court has jurisdiction to review final orders of 
removal issued by the BIA, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).  
The government contends that petitioner‟s challenge amounts 
to a disagreement with the BIA‟s determination that he failed 
to sufficiently demonstrate that public officials in Colombia 
would likely acquiesce in his torture.  This Court would lack 
jurisdiction to consider such a challenge.  8 U.S.C. § 
1252(a)(2)(C)-(D).  This Court does, however, have 
jurisdiction over “constitutional claims or questions of law.”6  
                                                 
6
 Determining “what is likely to happen to the petitioner if 
removed” is a factual inquiry outside the scope of our review, 
but determining whether “what is likely to happen amount[s] 
to the legal definition of torture” is a legal question.  Kaplun 
v. Att‟y Gen., 602 F.3d 260, 271 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 
In Kaplun, we noted that 
 
Torture is a term of art, and 
whether imprisonment, beating, 
and extortion are severe enough to 
rise to the level of torture is a 
legal question.  While the 
underlying facts vary from 
petitioner to petitioner, the legal 
question remains the same: do the 
facts found by the IJ (and that the 
BIA determines are not clearly 
erroneous) meet the legal 
requirements for relief under the 
CAT? 
 13 
Pierre v. Att‟y Gen., 528 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2008) (en 
banc) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)-(D)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Additionally, as the government 
concedes,
7
 this Court has jurisdiction to determine whether 
the Board adjudicated Pieschacon-Villegas‟s application for 
deferral of removal under an incorrect legal standard.   
The government mischaracterizes the BIA‟s decision, 
at least in part, when it contends that the BIA applied the 
correct legal standard.  Despite acknowledging that 
government acquiescence can be demonstrated by showing 
that the government is willfully blind to torturous activities, 
the BIA incorrectly stated that a number of specific 
circumstances cannot constitute acquiescence.  Furthermore, 
the BIA misapplied the legal standard by ignoring evidence 
relevant to determining whether Pieschacon-Villegas will 
more likely than not be subjected to torture upon removal.  
Although the BIA has discretion to hold that this evidence is 
insufficient to meet Pieschacon-Villegas‟s burden, the BIA 
lacks authority to ignore this evidence altogether.      
When the BIA issues its own decision on the merits, 
rather than a summary affirmance, we review its decision, not 
that of the IJ.  Sheriff v. Att‟y Gen., 587 F.3d 584, 588 (3d 
Cir. 2009).  We review legal determinations de novo, subject 
to the principles of deference articulated in Chevron v. Nat. 
Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).  Briseno-Flores 
v. Att‟y Gen., 492 F.3d 226, 228 (3d Cir. 2007).   
                                                                                                             
Id. 
7
 (Respondent‟s Br. at 20.) 
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III. ANALYSIS 
A. Article 3 of CAT 
 Under Article 3 of CAT, “[n]o State Party shall . . . 
expel, return („refouler‟) or extradite a person to another 
State where there are substantial grounds for believing that 
he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.”  Art. 
3(1), S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.  We 
have stated that 
For an act to constitute torture 
under the [CAT] and the 
implementing regulations, it must 
be: (1) an act causing severe 
physical or mental pain or 
suffering; (2) intentionally 
inflicted; (3) for an illicit or 
proscribed purpose; (4) by or at 
the instigation of or with the 
consent or acquiescence of a 
public official who has custody or 
physical control of the victim; and 
(5) not arising from lawful 
sanctions. 
Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 151 (3d Cir. 2005).   
An applicant for relief under Article 3 of CAT “bears 
the burden of establishing „that it is more likely than not that 
he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed 
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country of removal.‟”8  Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 
174-75 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2)).  The 
applicant must establish that he or she, more likely than not, 
will be subjected to torturous acts inflicted “by or at the 
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public 
official or other person acting in an official capacity.”  8 
C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1) (2006).   
B. Acquiescence 
“Acquiescence of a public official requires that the 
public official, prior to the activity constituting torture, have 
awareness of such activity and thereafter breach his or her 
legal responsibility to intervene and prevent such activity.”  8 
C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(7).  “If an alien produces sufficient 
evidence to satisfy that burden, withholding of removal or 
deferring of removal is mandatory.”  Silva-Rengifo v. Att‟y 
Gen., 473 F.3d 58, 64 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 
1208.16–.18).   
The acquiescence that must be established for deferral 
of removal does not require that the government have actual 
knowledge of the torturous activity; instead, governmental 
acquiescence may be shown “by producing sufficient 
evidence that the government in question is willfully blind to 
such activities.”  Id. at 65; see also Gomez-Zuluaga v. Att‟y 
Gen., 527 F.3d 330, 350 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Silva-
Rengifo, 473 F.3d at 65).   
                                                 
8
 “An „alien‟s testimony, if credible, may be sufficient to 
sustain the burden of proof without corroboration.‟”  Kamara 
v. Att‟y Gen., 420 F.3d 202, 213 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting 
Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 471 (3d Cir. 2003)).   
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In its decision regarding Pieschacon-Villegas, the BIA 
made three unqualified statements regarding different 
circumstances under which a government is not willfully 
blind and does not acquiesce: (1) when a government is 
unable to control the entities carrying out the torture; (2) 
when a government actively opposes the entities that the 
applicant fears; and (3) when the only evidence is the 
existence of a pattern of flagrant or mass violations of human 
rights within the country. 
i. Government Inability to Control 
In its decision, the BIA stated that CAT “protection 
does not extend to persons who fear entities that a 
government is unable to control.”  In re Pieschacon-Villegas, 
A049 191 076, at 2 (BIA Dec. 3, 2009).  In Silva-Rengifo, 
however, we noted that, “although a government‟s ability to 
control a particular group may be relevant to an inquiry into 
governmental acquiescence under the CAT, that inquiry does 
not turn on a government‟s „ability to control‟ persons or 
groups engaging in torturous activity.”  473 F.3d at 65.     
In Gomez-Zuluaga, we reaffirmed the possibility that 
the Colombian government could be willfully blind and thus 
be found to have acquiesced, even if it was unable to control 
those engaged in torturous activity.  527 F.3d at 350–51.  In 
that case, we held that two government representatives each 
telling the petitioner that “there was nothing they could do to 
protect her” from the FARC “may be circumstantial evidence 
that the Colombian government was willfully blind to such 
treatment and that to pursue official assistance would have 
been futile.”  Id. at 351 (remanding to the BIA for 
consideration in light of the proper standard, namely that 
articulated in Silva-Rengifo). 
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The BIA‟s assumption that “[CAT] protection does not 
extend to persons who fear entities that a government is 
unable to control” contradicts our holdings in Silva-Rengifo 
and Gomez-Zuluaga that a government‟s ability to control 
groups engaged in torturous activities may be relevant to, but 
is not dispositive of, an assessment of willful blindness.  In re 
Pieschacon-Villegas, A049 191 076, at 2 (BIA Dec. 3, 2009).  
The BIA should conduct a review that takes into account our 
precedent that an applicant may be able to establish 
governmental acquiescence in some circumstances, even 
where the government is unable to protect its citizens from 
persecution. 
ii. Government Opposes Entities Carrying 
out Torture 
The BIA stated in its decision that it “reject[ed] 
[Pieschacon-Villegas‟s] argument on appeal that the 
Colombian government would acquiesce to his torture under 
a willful blindness theory” because “the record reflects that 
the Colombian government actively opposes the 
organizations that the respondent fears.”  In re Pieschacon-
Villegas, A049 191 076, at 2 (BIA Dec. 3, 2009) (internal 
citation omitted).  We held, however, in Gomez-Zuluaga, that 
“[t]he mere fact that the Colombian government is engaged in 
a protracted civil war with the FARC does not necessarily 
mean that it cannot remain willfully blind to the torturous acts 
of the FARC.”  527 F.3d at 351.  Gomez-Zuluaga had 
submitted country reports stating that the Colombian 
government was aware that the FARC routinely tortured, 
mutilated, and killed people and that “paramilitaries 
sympathetic to the government often engage in similar 
activities with tacit approval from the government.”  Id.  In 
that case, we held that there may be tacit governmental 
 18 
approval of, and willful blindness toward, the torturous 
activities of an entity, even if the Colombian government is 
engaged in a war with that entity. 
The BIA should conduct a review that takes into 
account our precedent that an applicant can establish 
governmental acquiescence even if the government opposes 
the paramilitary organization that is engaged in torturous 
acts.
9
 
                                                 
9
 In De la Rosa v. Holder, 598 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2010), the 
Second Circuit remanded to the BIA a matter with facts 
strikingly similar to those in Pieschacon-Villegas.  There, the 
court noted that the BIA appeared to have assumed that some 
government officials previously taking action to prevent De la 
Rosa‟s torture “overrides both the complicity of other 
government actors and the general corruption and 
ineffectiveness of the Dominican government in preventing 
unlawful killings.”  Id. at 110.  The court continued that  
 
[I]t is not clear to this Court why 
the preventative efforts of some 
government actors should 
foreclose the possibility of 
government acquiescence, as a 
matter of law, under the CAT.  
Where a government contains 
officials that would be complicit 
in torture, and that government, 
on the whole, is admittedly 
incapable of actually preventing 
that torture, the fact that some 
officials take action to prevent the 
 19 
 
iii. Country Conditions 
The BIA noted in its decision that “the existence of a 
consistent pattern of gross, flagrant, or mass violations of 
human rights in a particular country does not, as such, 
constitute sufficient grounds for determining that a particular 
person would be in danger of being subject to torture upon his 
return to that country.”  In re Pieschacon-Villegas, A049 191 
076, at 2 (BIA Dec. 3, 2009).  In Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 
                                                                                                             
torture would seem neither 
inconsistent with a finding of 
government acquiescence nor 
necessarily responsive to the 
question of whether torture would 
be “inflicted by or at the 
instigation of or with the consent 
or acquiescence of a public 
official or other person acting in 
an official capacity.” 
Id.  The Second Circuit remanded, asking the BIA to “issue a 
precedential opinion on whether, as a matter of law, a 
government may acquiesce to a person‟s torture where (1) 
some officials attempt to prevent that torture (2) while other 
officials are complicit, and (3) the government is admittedly 
unable to actually prevent the torture from taking place.”  Id. 
at 110–11.  Unlike De la Rosa, where the Second Circuit said 
the BIA “appears to have assumed” this proposition, in the 
BIA‟s decision regarding Pieschacon-Villegas, the BIA 
explicitly stated these propositions that contradict our 
precedent.   
 20 
F.3d 463 (3d Cir. 2003), however, we held that “[o]fficial as 
well as unofficial country reports are probative evidence and 
can, by themselves, provide sufficient proof to sustain an 
alien‟s burden under the INA.”  Id. at 477 (citing Kamalthas 
v. INS, 251 F.3d 1279, 1284 (9th Cir. 2001)).  “„[G]ross, 
flagrant or mass violations of human rights within the country 
of removal . . .‟ can corroborate an alien‟s claim that he/she 
will be subjected to torture upon return; thus allowing the 
alien to present the proof necessary for establishing a claim 
under the Convention Against Torture.”  Id. at 478 (quoting 8 
C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(3)) (citing Kamalthas, 251 F.3d at 1284) 
(remanding to the IJ because “[t]he BIA‟s de novo analysis 
never considers this” possibility).   
The BIA should conduct a review that is not in tension 
with our precedent that country conditions can, by 
themselves, constitute sufficient grounds for determining that 
an applicant would more likely than not be subjected to 
torture upon return to the country of removal. 
C. Considering all relevant evidence and facts found 
by IJ 
When the IJ or BIA analyzes whether it is more likely 
than not that an applicant seeking relief would be tortured if 
removed to the proposed country of removal, it must consider 
all evidence relevant to the 
possibility of future torture shall 
be considered, including but not 
limited to: 
(i) Evidence of past torture 
inflicted upon the applicant; 
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(ii) Evidence that the applicant 
could relocate to a part of the 
country of removal where he or 
she is not likely to be tortured; 
(iii) Evidence of gross, flagrant or 
mass violations of human rights 
within the country of removal, 
where applicable; and 
(iv) Other relevant information 
regarding conditions in the 
country of removal. 
8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(3) (emphasis added); see also Lavira v. 
Att‟y Gen., 478 F.3d 158, 171 (3d Cir. 2007) (“IJs are 
obligated to consider „all evidence relevant to the possibility 
of future torture‟ (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(3)), overruled 
on other grounds by Pierre v. Att‟y Gen., 528 F.3d 180 (3d 
Cir. 2008); McAllister v. Att‟y Gen., 444 F.3d 178, 189 (3d 
Cir. 2006) (“In its assessment of whether an alien will likely 
be tortured in the country of removal, the BIA must consider 
„all evidence relevant to the possibility of future torture,‟ 
including „information regarding conditions in the country of 
removal.” (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(3)); Kamara v. Att‟y 
Gen., 420 F.3d 202, 213 n.8 (3d Cir. 2005); Sevoian v. 
Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 175 (3d Cir. 2002) (“Decision-
makers evaluating claims under the Convention should pay 
attention to „evidence of past torture inflicted upon the 
applicant‟ as well as considering all other relevant evidence.” 
(quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(3)(i) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 
208.16(c)(3))). 
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The BIA decision does not show that the Board 
considered “all evidence relevant to the possibility of future 
torture.”  Further, the BIA decision does not reference or 
show a meaningful consideration of relevant evidence 
discussed in the IJ‟s decision; the IJ‟s findings regarding 
Pieschacon-Villegas‟s credibility;10 the threats allegedly made 
against Pieschacon-Villegas and his family and that 
Amezquita allegedly told others that Pieschacon-Villegas was 
a “rat;” the FBI‟s alleged recommendation that Pieschacon-
Villegas‟s wife not return to Colombia for her own safety; or 
the alleged attempt to harm Pieschacon-Villegas in the 2007 
Barranquilla jail incident.   
Additionally, although the BIA decision referenced 
country reports in the record, the decision does not indicate 
that the BIA considered that those country reports indicated 
that a number of government officials have been suspected of, 
or charged with, civil rights violations or involvement in 
paramilitary atrocities, including murder and forced 
disappearances, or that the Colombian government claims 
that all paramilitary organizations have demobilized despite 
abundant evidence to the contrary.      
As one of the Board‟s reasons for dismissing 
Pieschacon-Villegas‟s appeal, the BIA noted that “[s]pecific 
grounds must exist that indicate the respondent would be 
personally at risk.”  In re Pieschacon-Villegas, A049 191 076, 
                                                 
10
 The IJ found credible Pieschacon-Villegas‟s testimony that 
he cooperated with the FBI in operations targeting criminal 
organizations and involving individuals with ties to the AUC.  
The IJ also found credible Pieschacon-Villegas‟s testimony 
that his cooperation with the FBI would endanger his life if he 
returned to Colombia. 
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at 2 (BIA Dec. 3, 2009).  The BIA did not explicitly deem 
clearly erroneous the IJ‟s finding of credibility regarding 
Pieschacon-Villegas‟s testimony that his cooperation with the 
FBI would endanger his life if he returned to Colombia.  
Similarly, the Board did not offer reasons for implicitly 
concluding that there was no record evidence of specific 
grounds that Pieschacon-Villegas would be personally at risk.  
The BIA decision did not explain why none of the evidence, 
including evidence or testimony of Pieschacon-Villegas‟s 
cooperation with the FBI in targeting paramilitary 
organizations, the alleged threats, the alleged prior attempt to 
harm him, and the information contained in the country 
reports, constituted a specific ground indicating that he would 
be personally at risk.  Although the BIA has the discretion to 
find that, despite the relevant evidence, Pieschacon-Villegas 
has not shown that he is more likely than not to be subjected 
to torture if removed to Colombia, the BIA lacks authority to 
ignore any “evidence relevant to the possibility of future 
torture” when making that determination.  8 C.F.R. § 
208.16(c)(3)   
IV. CONCLUSION 
 For the reasons set forth above, we will grant the 
petition for review and remand to the BIA for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
